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INTRODUCTION
Do welfare regimes infl uence the views 
on the role of state? The affi rmative answers 
to this question are usually based on three 
interrelated ideas. The fi rst is the main 
claim of the power resources approach, 
most famously argued by Esping-Andersen, 
that different welfare institutional confi gu-
rations (regimes) stem out of the differen-
tial power of the working-class movements 
and the political coalitions at particular his-
torical moments (Esping-Andersen, 1990; 
Brooks & Manza, 2007; Aidukaite, 2009). 
Next is the claim, in congruence with the 
path-dependency theories, that once the 
welfare regimes are established, they are 
slow to change and their further develop-
ments follow the established trajectories 
(Brooks & Manza, 2007). Finally, values 
are even slower to change than institutions, 
so the ideological pillars of the established 
welfare regimes become embedded in peo-
ples’ preferences and expectations (Brooks 
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& Manza, 2007). These, in turn, provide 
legitimacy for the institutional persistence 
and thwart further institutional change 
(Esping-Andersen, 1999; Andreß & He-
ien, 2001; Brooks & Manza, 2007). Hence, 
different welfare regimes are expected to 
shape different welfare public preferences, 
which then sustain existing institutional 
confi gurations. 
Nevertheless, the research examining 
the link between welfare regimes and wel-
fare attitudes is inconclusive. Some studies 
found little effect of the welfare regimes 
on attitudes, while others found attitudes 
clustering in accordance with the regime 
expectations (Blekesaune & Quadagno, 
2003; Jæger, 2006a). However,  as Jæger 
(2009) notes, various studies operational-
ized welfare regimes differently, which 
often resulted in the same countries being 
classifi ed as different regimes. This natu-
rally leads to inconsistent results. Further, 
welfare attitudes were operationalized dif-
ferently as well, as some examined general 
attitudes towards state or redistribution, 
and others examined attitudes to specifi c 
welfare policies (Svallfors, 2010). Howev-
er, when a study seeks to examine the link 
between welfare regimes and ideological 
regime expectations, as the present study 
does, examining general attitudes seems a 
more appropriate strategy. 
The post-communist states further com-
plicate the regime classifi cations, and many 
studies exclude them from the analyses of 
the welfare state attitudes. This might have 
been justifi ed in times of their former com-
munist regimes, but today the excuses for 
excluding the Central and Eastern Euro-
pean countries from the “worlds of welfare 
capitalism” must certainly wear thin. In-
deed, neglecting the post-communist states, 
with their  shared communist welfare fea-
tures and different welfare paths after the 
1989/1991 ruptures (Deacon, 2000; Fenger, 
2007; Aidukaite, 2009), means losing po-
tentially quite a fruitful area for the inves-
tigation of the link between the institutions 
and attitudes in times of change. 
Therefore, the present study examines 
whether the welfare state attitudes sepa-
rate the post-communist countries from 
other European welfare states which did 
not experience such a radical institutional 
transformation just one generation ago. To 
further gauge the link between the insti-
tutional heritage and the welfare state at-
titudes, the study focuses on the attitudes 
of the communist and the post-communist 
cohorts, where the former were socialized 
in communism and the latter in capitalism. 
Finally, these two cohorts’ welfare state 
attitudes are compared to the attitudes of 




In his 1990 book The Three Worlds of 
Welfare Capitalism, Esping-Andersen ana-
lyzes 18 advanced industrial democracies 
and proposes that they cluster into three 
welfare regimes, based on historical devel-
opments and levels of decommodifi cation 
and stratifi cation, which are also partly due 
to the different ideological roles accorded 
to the state, market and family in providing 
for people’s needs (Esping-Andersen, 1990, 
1999). At one end are the liberal regimes 
with low decommodification and high 
stratifi cation in which the role of state is the 
weakest and the role of market the strongest, 
as the individuals are responsible for their 
own welfare (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Arts 
& Gelissen, 2001). The conservative-corpo-
ratist regimes are in the middle, as their en-
titlements are tied to social contributions, so 
the individuals’ labor market status affects 
their decommodifi cation and stratifi cation 
levels. Hence, the role of state is strong, but 
limited to the working population, while the 
rest must depend on family to take care of 
their needs (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Arts 
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& Gelissen, 2001). At the other end are the 
social democratic regimes, characterized 
by high decommodifi cation and the least 
stratifying or status-based effect of social 
policies, where much of  the burden of in-
dividuals’ and family’s needs is taken over 
by the state through the universal benefi ts 
and the provision of services (Esping-An-
dersen, 1990).
The three welfare regimes argument 
has been immensely infl uential. Admit-
tedly, it underwent various critiques and 
several re-conceptualizations (for a review, 
see Arts & Gelissen, 2002), but in its sim-
plicity and resonance it remains one of the 
most empirically implemented classifi ca-
tions. Further, many re-conceptualizations 
use different regime indicators, but remain 
similar to Esping-Andersen’s three-fold 
distinction (Arts & Gelissen, 2002). How-
ever, some authors argue for additional re-
gime types. Thus, in the European context, 
Ferrera (1996) proposes that Italy, Greece, 
Spain and Portugal should be classifi ed as 
a Southern or Mediterranean regime. For 
example, these countries are characterized 
by an important ideological role of family 
stemming from the strong religious infl u-
ences and the prevalence of the traditional 
perspectives on family (Ferrera, 1996). But, 
in the context of this paper, the complex 
role of state in the Mediterranean regimes 
is even more interesting. The ruling elites 
of the Mediterranean regimes traditionally 
espouse the corporatist ideology, which is 
the reason why these countries are usu-
ally classifi ed as conservative-corporatist 
regimes. At the same time, however, these 
countries also share a tradition of the Left 
parties pushing for socialist reforms (Fer-
rera, 1996). These Left parties are tradition-
ally not a part of the ruling structures, but 
their continual presence in the political life 
“disrupts” the established position of the 
corporatist ideology by presumably larger 
demands from the state than it  would be ex-
pected in the political cultures of countries 
not characterized by such a strong, even if 
only oppositional, socialist tradition. Such 
increased statist expectations of the Medi-
terranean regimes stemming from their so-
cialist tradition may be further compounded 
by yet another feature of the Mediterranean 
regimes noted by Ferrera (1996). Specifi -
cally, these countries are characterized by 
relatively new democratic institutions de-
veloped in the post-authoritarian contexts 
which sustain weak and bureaucratic state 
institutions and contribute to the corrup-
tion and political clientelism. Such devel-
opments may have established a parallel 
system of informal statist expectations, as 
the everyday practices of the Mediterrane-
an populations taught them to expect they 
would have their needs satisfi ed by the state, 
provided they followed the “rules” of such 
a corrupt and bureaucratic system. 
The entrance of post-communist coun-
tries to the stage of market democracies 
further rippled the waves of welfare re-
gimes debates.  Their earlier communist 
incarnations were characterized by extreme 
statism, proclaimed equality and generous 
social provisions, but also by ineffi ciency 
and hidden privileges (Deacon, 2000). Both 
these similarities and these countries’ near-
simultaneous embrace of democracy and 
capitalism often blur the abundant/numer-
ous differences between former communist 
regimes, both in their communist and pre-
communist paths. Indeed, based on these 
differences, many researchers argue that, 
from the historical viewpoint, one should 
differentiate between the Central European, 
Balkan and Soviet-successor post-com-
munist countries (Ekiert & Hanson, 2003; 
Kitschelt, 2003; Kopstein & Reilly, 2003). 
Further, with the post-communist transfor-
mations in the 1990s, these countries started 
on diverse paths of further welfare devel-
opments, both in the levels of acceptance 
of the liberal reforms and in the speed and 
scope of social policy reforms (see the 1996 
World Bank and the 1998 UNDP report de-
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scribed in Deacon, 2000; Kovács, 2002). As 
a result, various authors disagree whether 
one should focus on the internal differences 
when discussing the post-communist wel-
fare regimes, or on their underlying simi-
larities. In one approach, the various post-
communist countries are discussed in terms 
of how their specifi c welfare developments 
fi t into Esping-Andersen’s classifi cation. A 
different viewpoint, however, posits that the 
general trends of a “post-socialist” welfare 
state can be examined. This type of analysis 
usually discusses whether these countries 
are succumbing to the external liberalizing 
pressures or whether they are developing 
towards a conservative-corporatist regime, 
particularly in the context of their Bismarc-
kian legacies and the pull of the European 
integrations (Deacon, 2000; Kovács, 2002; 
Fenger, 2007; Aidukaite, 2009; Szikra & 
Tomka, 2009).  Finally, some authors also 
question if the discussion of the post-com-
munist countries within the framework of 
Esping-Andersen’s classifi cation is appro-
priate at all or if these states exhibit char-
acteristics of institutional hybrids (Cerami, 
2006; Cerami & Vanhuysse, 2009). 
Therefore, the final judgment on the 
post-communist welfare state or states 
seems far from settled. However, for the 
purposes of the present article, it is not nec-
essary to engage in these debates. Instead, 
I made a pragmatic decision to include all 
the post-communist countries as one “post-
communist regime”, based solely on choos-
ing their “post-communist condition” as the 
characteristic that, I hypothesize, still ties 
these countries together despite their possi-
bly divergent welfare paths after the ruptures 
of 1989/91. Thus, this becomes the only 
characteristic salient for the present study. 
This is, of course, a simplifi cation – being 
post-communist is not these countries’ only 
defi ning feature. But, since the present study 
asks whether the shared communist welfare 
heritage can be detected in the expectations 
about the strong role of state and if this dis-
tinguishes this particular set of countries 
from their Western European neighbors, it 
follows that for the purposes of this study 
“the post-communist condition” is the most 
salient feature of these countries. In light 
of this, perhaps the most important shared 
characteristic of the post-communist coun-
tries is their heritage of the (communist) 
statism (Deacon, 2000), which, similarly 
to the social-democratic regimes, accorded 
the greatest role in taking care of people’s 
needs to the state. However, similarly to the 
Mediterranean regimes, another heritage of 
the communist regimes is the bureaucratic 
ineffi ciency and nepotism (Deacon, 2000), 
as well as the context of a relatively recent 
democratization in the post-authoritarian 
or even semi-authoritarian states. Further, 
considering that the pre-communist wel-
fare traditions were mostly based on the 
Bismarckian tradition, this adds possible 
corporatist elements to the mix of the high 
(informal) statist expectations and malfunc-
tioning public administration system. With 
this, the welfare post-communist institution-
al contexts become startlingly similar to the 
Mediterranean regimes’ contexts.  
1 The other usually mentioned predictor of the welfare state attitudes is self-interest, which also functions 
both at the individual and the country level. The self-interest argument suggests that welfare state attitudes refl ect 
interests which stem from individuals’ structural positions. Specifi cally, those in vulnerable positions (e.g. lower 
educated, older, unemployed) more likely support the extensive role of the state, particularly in the area of their 
vulnerability (Gelissen, 2000; Andreß & Heien, 2001; Arts & Gelissen, 2001; Blekesaune & Quadagno, 2003; 
Jæger, 2006b ). At the country-level, the explanations are sought in a country’s (macro)economic performance, 
where the inhabitants of the countries with poorer performance would be more favorably inclined towards a 
generous welfare state (Blekesaune & Quadagno, 2003; Brooks & Manza, 2007). The self-interest, however, is 
not of a substantive interest in the present study, and it will therefore be used only as a control.
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Welfare State Attitudes and Welfare 
Regimes
A popular hypothesis in the welfare at-
titudes research proposes ideology as one 
of the important predictors of the welfare 
state attitudes. Ideology, the argument goes, 
infl uences welfare attitudes both at the in-
dividual and at the country level.1 At the 
individual level, the more general values 
determine welfare attitudes. For example, 
those with egalitarian, leftist or postma-
terialist values are more supportive of the 
state (Gelissen, 2000; Andreß & Heien, 
2001; Arts & Gelissen, 2001; Blekesaune & 
Quadagno, 2003; Jæger, 2006b; Aidukaite, 
2009). However, Svallfors (2010) considers 
this type of attitudes-by-attitudes explana-
tions problematic. I agree with his posi-
tion since, if the two sets of substantively 
related attitudes cluster together, it is dif-
fi cult to disentangle the direction of their 
mutual infl uences. More relevant for the 
purpose of the present paper, then, are the 
country-level ideological infl uences on the 
welfare attitudes. In this type of ideological 
explanations, the welfare state attitudes are 
linked with the welfare regimes, which also 
includes the assumptions of the entrench-
ment of the attitudes and the feedback loop 
between the institutional confi gurations and 
values (Brooks & Manza, 2007). In other 
words, the established welfare regimes are 
expected to shape the expectations about the 
welfare state, thus leading to cross-national 
variation in attitudes consistent with the 
regime differences. Therefore, support for 
the strong role of state would be the great-
est in the social democratic regimes and the 
smallest in the liberal regimes.
The results of the research examining 
the link between the welfare regimes and 
welfare state attitudes, however, are mixed 
and inconclusive (Blekesaune & Quadagno, 
2003; Jæger, 2006a). For example, Gellis-
sen (2000) uses multilevel modeling on 
the 1992 Eurobarometer data to examine 
the support for the welfare state in 11 Eu-
ropean capitalist countries, and fi nds lit-
tle evidence of the regimes influencing 
attitudes. Svallfors (2003) compares the 
attitudes about government responsibility 
across eight Western capitalist countries 
in the 1996 ISSP data and reaches similar 
conclusions. Dallinger (2010) examines 
the support for income redistribution in 
the 1999 ISSP data for 23 capitalist and 
post-communist countries using multilevel 
analysis, and also fi nds little effect of the 
welfare regime on attitudes. Nevertheless, 
there is also evidence for the regime-based 
clustering of attitudes. For example, Andreß 
and Heien (2001) compare the support for 
government responsibility and equality in 
the 1992 ISSP data in West and East Ger-
many, Norway and the USA by structural 
equation models, and they fi nd the expected 
attitude differences. Similarly, Linos and 
West (2003) fi nd the regime differences in 
the redistribution attitudes in the 1992 ISSP 
data for Norway, Germany, Australia and 
the USA. Arts and Gelissen (2001) examine 
19 Western democracies using multilevel 
modeling on the 1996 ISSP and 1999 EVS 
data and conclude that regimes matter in 
expectations about state’s role for solidarity. 
Finally, Brooks and Manza (2007) also fi nd 
the welfare state attitudes clustering across 
regimes in fi ve ISSP waves (1988-2001) in 
16 developed democracies.
Many studies, however, use different 
classifi cations of welfare regimes, which 
may explain their inconsistent results. 
Sometimes they include only the typical 
representatives, such as Sweden, Norway 
or Denmark as social democratic (Gelis-
sen, 2000; Andreß & Heien, 2001; Dal-
linger, 2010), France, Austria or (West) 
Germany as conservative (Andreß & Heien, 
2001; Dallinger, 2010) and the UK or the 
USA as liberal regimes (Andreß & Heien, 
2001; Dallinger, 2010). They may or may 
not include the Mediterranean or Antipo-
dean regimes. For example, Gelissen and 
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Dallinger differentiate the Mediterranean 
regime, while Brooks and Manza do not. 
Svallfors defi nes Australia and New Zeland 
as Antipodean regimes, while Dallinger and 
Brooks and Manza classify them as liberal. 
In addition, Dallinger’s is one of rare stud-
ies including the post-communist countries, 
which she classifi es as a separate regime. 
Further problems arise with the countries 
which are untypical or hybrid types (the 
Netherlands is such an example), and in-
deed, in practice, most countries are hybrid 
types, which in turn leads to disagreements 
about classifi cations across various studies 
(Arts & Gelissen, 2002). Some studies at-
tempt to avoid the classifi cation problem by 
looking at various country-level character-
istics instead of classifying countries into 
regimes. Such studies, however, usually 
analyze the effects of particular predictors 
(such as public social spending), rather 
than the link between the institutional and 
the attitudinal clustering (see, for example, 
Jæger, 2006a).  
Regime classifi cation is a problem the 
present study faces as well. However, as I 
am interested in the infl uence of the long-
term institutional confi gurations on the state 
attitudes, I use the welfare regimes prima-
rily as indicators of country’s welfare her-
itage. This allows me to sidestep the issue 
of regime change and hybrid types and to 
theoretically categorize countries based on 
their main historical heritage. For example, 
Ireland incorporates both the liberal and the 
corporatist elements and it is variously clas-
sifi ed as liberal or conservative (McCashin 
& O’Shea, 2009). However, the Irish wel-
fare state was created during the British rule 
and the liberal tradition remained strong 
even after the independence, despite the lat-
er heavy infl uences of the Catholic Church 
and the corporatist policies (McCashin & 
O’Shea, 2009).  Hence, based on its long-
term liberal heritage, I classify Ireland as a 
liberal regime, the same as the UK. Further, 
the Netherlands is a hybrid between the so-
cial democratic and corporatist regime, but 
I classify it as a corporatist, based on the 
prevalence of such classifi cations among 
other authors  (Arts & Gelissen, 2002). The 
other countries classifi ed as corporatist are 
Austria, Belgium, France, West Germany 
and Luxembourg. The countries classifi ed 
as social democratic are Denmark, Finland 
and Sweden. 
I also include the Mediterranean and 
post-communist countries as separate re-
gimes based on their distinct historical de-
velopments. The Mediterranean regimes are 
Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, to which 
I add Malta and Cyprus, as members of the 
extended family of Mediterranean states 
(Gal, 2010). Malta and Cyprus are actu-
ally hybrid regimes (Briguglio & Bugeja, 
2011; Shekeris, Ioannou, & Panayiotopou-
los, 2009; Pace, 2009; Gal, 2010). They are 
both former British colonies characterized 
by the liberal tradition2,which is combined 
with the strong religious infl uences, the re-
liance on the family, the bureaucratic sys-
tem, the partisan and clientelistic politics, 
the labor market segmentation and a large 
shadow economy, which all characterize 
Mediterranean regimes (Briguglio & Buge-
ja, 2011; Shekeris et al., 2009; Pace, 2009; 
Gal, 2010). In addition, with other Mediter-
ranean states, Malta and Cyprus also share 
a young democratic tradition (which is here 
placed in the post-colonial, rather than post-
authoritarian context) and the late moderni-
zation (Gal, 2010). Due to these historical 
developments, Malta and Cyprus are clas-
sifi ed as Mediterranean regimes. 
Finally, since the communist countries 
were particularly characterized by the 
2 Although Malta also had a strong pre-British socialist tradition from the period when it was ruled by the 
Knights of the St John.
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communist statist tradition and the present 
study focuses on the extreme support for 
the state’s responsibility for people’s needs 
in the examination of the welfare state at-
titudes, I classify all post-communist coun-
tries as the post-communist regime. This 
includes Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, East Germany, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak Re-
public and Slovenia. 
Cultural Lag and the Generational 
Change in the Post-Communist 
Context 
Contrary to popular pre-transition be-
liefs, the post-communist institutional 
transformations were not immediately fol-
lowed by new democratic and capitalist 
values (Arts & Gijsberts, 1998; Aligica, 
2003). Indeed, many post-communist prob-
lems could be traced to people not adapting 
successfully to the institutional demands of 
the new capitalist systems. These unsuc-
cessful adaptations were often explained 
by people’s persistent communist expecta-
tions (Sztompka, 1996; Arts, Gelissen, & 
Luijkx, 2003). When faced with the new 
uncertainties of their lives, the people of 
the post-communist countries often con-
tinued to expect from the state to take care 
of their needs, as it did in communism. For 
example, a study based on the 1991 Inter-
national Social Justice Project (ISJP) data 
found greater support for the role of state 
in East Germany than in West Germany 
(Wegener, Lippl, & Christoph, 2000). Simi-
larly, another ISJP study comparing West-
ern democratic and post-communist CEE 
countries found that the post-communist 
populations required greater state inter-
vention than their Western counterparts, 
and these expectations of state’s interven-
tion were only moderately weaker in 1996 
than in 1991 (Örkény & Székely, 2000). 
Furthermore, this East/West distinction 
held even a decade later, as demonstrated 
by the higher support for “socialist” socio-
economic principle of justice and govern-
ment intervention in CEE countries found 
in a study based on the 1999/2000 EVS 
data (Arts et al., 2003).  In light of this di-
vide in values and expectations about the 
role of state between the non-communist 
and the post-communist regimes, I expect 
that the post-communist populations will 
generally have higher statist expectations 
than their counterparts in other European 
welfare regimes, with a possible exception 
of the people in the Mediterranean regimes 
whose institutional contexts also support 
high informal statist expectations.
Such persistence of expectations related 
to the communist socio-economic or po-
litical order among people who spent their 
lives in communist societies is unsurprising. 
Indeed, the life-course research suggests 
that values and attitudes formed during 
adolescence and early adulthood (forma-
tive or impressionable years) remain stable 
thereafter (Krosnick & Alwin, 1989; Al-
win, Cohen, & Newcomb, 1991; Alwin & 
Krosnick, 1991; Sears & Funk, 1999). Fur-
ther, the values and attitudes after forma-
tive years should remain stable even in the 
face of institutional changes, thus resulting 
in the cultural lag of the older generations 
(Sztompka, 1996; Pollack, Jacobs, Müller, 
& Pickel, 2003). It would follow, then, that 
the generations who spent their formative 
years in the established communist regimes 
would exhibit such cultural lag in their val-
ues, and particularly in their statist expecta-
tions as the perception of the state’s role was 
one of the crucial differences between the 
communist and capitalist regimes. Howev-
er, this life-course model of attitude change 
also posits that the new generations, social-
ized within new cultural and institutional 
frameworks, will exhibit a new set of val-
ues, different from those of their preceding 
generations, and thus these new generations 
will affect a transformation of the dominant 
societal values (Alwin et al., 1991; Alwin 
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& McCammon, 2003; Sztompka, 1996; 
Inglehart, 2000). From this it follows that 
the “communist cultural lag” will disap-
pear with the so-called post-communist 
generations. Therefore, in the present study, 
I expect that the new post-communist gen-
erations will be less supportive of the state 
responsibility than the people fully social-
ized in communism.
Such cohort differences between the 
youngest and the older generations should 
be absent from other (non-communist) 
European welfare regimes, as these gen-
erations did not experience such a radi-
cal relatively recent transformation in the 
ruling economic and political order that 
would affect such a dramatic cohort gap. 
This is not to say that there will be no co-
hort differences in the expectations about 
the role of the state between the various 
generations of the non-communist welfare 
regimes. On the contrary, various genera-
tions in the non-communist welfare regimes 
have also been socialized in the societies 
that changed their welfare institutional ar-
rangements and their welfare state expecta-
tions. Specifi cally, the period between the 
World War II and the 1970s was character-
ized by a drastic expansion of the welfare 
state, accompanied by the rise of the idea 
of universal social rights (Nullmeier & 
Kaufmann, 2010). In the 1980s, however, 
the welfare state’s legitimacy was increas-
ingly questioned, and in the 1990s in par-
ticular the welfare states weakened due 
to the  more pervasive globalization and 
stronger liberalizing pressures (Nullmeier 
& Kaufmann, 2010; Swank, 2010). Hence, 
the younger generations of the non-com-
munist welfare regimes were socialized in 
the less “welfare-state-friendly” societies 
and they will likely also have smaller ex-
pectations from the welfare state than their 
preceding generations. However, as the di-
vide between the “welfare-state-friendly” 
and the “welfare-state-unfriendly” stages 
in the non-communist regimes was less 
stark than the divide between the commu-
nist and post-communist welfare regimes, 
so  the cohort gap in the statist expectations 
in the non-communist regimes will be less 
wide than such cohort gap in the post-com-
munist regimes. Therefore, the argument of 
the present study is that, although the de-
velopments of the non-communist welfare 
regimes might have led to the cohort dif-
ferences in statist expectations between the 
younger and older generations, this cohort 
gap must be smaller than the cohort gap 
between the younger (post-communist) and 
older (communist) generations in the former 
communist societies which had affected 
such an about-face about their the welfare 
institutional arrangements and expectations 
about the state’s role in it.
In accordance with the arguments above, 
I propose the following hypotheses: 
H1: All individuals in the post-commu-
nist regimes are likely to support the 
extreme view on state responsibility 
more than the individuals in other 
European welfare regimes, control-
ling for self-interest factors, with the 
possible exception of the individuals 
in the Mediterranean welfare regimes 
who are also likely to have high statist 
expectations. 
H2: There are greater cohort differences 
(greater cohort gap) between the post-
communist and communist genera-
tions in the post-communist regimes in 
the support for extreme view on state 
responsibility than between their gen-




I use the data from the 2008 wave of the 
European Values Study (EVS), a cross-na-
tional and longitudinal survey of values in 
the European countries. The 2008 wave is 
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the fourth wave of the EVS which included 
representative samples of adult population 
in 47 European countries. My analysis is 
restricted to 27 European Union members 
(with West and East Germany analyzed 
separately) plus Croatia as an acceding 
member. The individual-level data is com-
plemented by the 2008 Eurostat and World 
Bank country-level data.
The present study examines (1) how the 
individual-level characteristics (cohort dif-
ferences) affect the extreme support for state 
responsibility; (2) how the ideological mac-
ro-determinants (welfare regimes) affect the 
extreme support for state responsibility, and 
(3) how welfare regimes mediate the cohort 
differences in the extreme support for state 
responsibility. This combines micro and 
macro levels of analysis in examining the 
extreme support for the state responsibility, 
which is here a binary outcome. Therefore, 
I use the multilevel or hierarchical gener-
alized linear models (HGLMs) for binary 
outcomes (Snijders & Bosker, 1999; Hox, 
2010). Multilevel modeling takes into con-
sideration the clustered structure of data 
and allows examining if the unexplained 
between-country variability can be ex-
plained by country-level variables (Snijders 
& Bosker, 1999; Hox, 2010).3   
HGLMs with the logit link were esti-
mated in Stata 11.2 using its default Full 
Maximum Likelihood Method (FML) with 
numerical integration (adaptive Gaussian 
quadrature).4 FML with numerical integra-
tion provides more precise estimates than 
the approximation methods (such as mar-
ginal or penalized quasi-likelihood meth-
ods) (Snijders & Bosker, 1999; Hox, 2010). 
It also has an additional benefi t of making 
the use of the deviance or likelihood ratio 
tests appropriate for the fi t of models and 
the signifi cance of the random effects (Sn-
ijders & Bosker, 1999; Hox, 2010). 
The missing data were treated by list-
wise deletion, which led to loss of 7% of 
the full sample. The listwise deletion may 
infl ate standard errors even when the data 
is missing completely at random (MCAR), 
and the non-MCAR data may produce bi-
ased estimates (Acock, 2005). Nevertheless, 
with the minimal amount of the missing 
data (usually below 5%) and with ignorable 
missingness, the listwise deletion is usu-
ally acceptable (Allison, 2009; McKnight, 
McKnight, Sidani, & Figueredo, 2007). 7% 
missing data in my analysis is larger than 
the recommended amount, but not overly 
so. The individuals in the subsample with 
missing values on the variables of interest 
were more likely females, less educated and 
less likely to have full-time employment or 
be self-employed, which violates the MCAR 
assumption, though assumption of the data 
missing at random (MAR) may still hold. 
The MAR assumption cannot be directly 
tested (Allison, 2009), but in eyeballing the 
data I have not noticed systemic patterns of 
missing values across variables of interest. 
Therefore, I used listwise deletion rather 
than more complex missing data treatments, 
such as multiple imputations (Acock, 2005), 
that, in combination with a method such as 
HGLM, are very computationally intensive 
and restrict post-estimation analyses. The 
sample with full information on variables of 
interest is a pooled sample of 29 countries 
(N) and 39019 respondents (n).
3 No clear agreement exists on the appropriate group size in multilevel modeling, and the considerations 
include study’s goals and practical concerns in collecting data (Snijders & Bosker, 1999; Hox, 2010). Kreft 
suggests 30 groups if the study centers on fi xed effects (Hox, 2010). Others relax this requirement and suggest 
that, under certain conditions, 20 group-level units could be suffi cient (Bickel, 2007). The present analysis with 
29 countries is, therefore, a study with small country-level sample size.
4 Stata’s xtmelogit currently does not allow using weights. In addition, my use of cohorts as predictors further 
removes benefi ts of weighing. Therefore, I did not use gender by age sampling weights provided by the EVS.
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Measures
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is a binary vari-
able Extreme Support for State Responsibil-
ity for Needs, which measures the degree 
of individual support for government meas-
ures. It was constructed out of the EVS item 
asking respondents to position their view on 
the 10-point scale from “Individuals should 
take more responsibility for providing for 
themselves” to “The state should take more 
responsibility to ensure that everyone is pro-
vided for”. The respondents who positioned 
themselves on the extreme end of the state 
responsibility side (points 8-10) were re-
coded as expressing Extreme Support for 
State Responsibility for Needs. 18.11% of all 
respondents in the non-missing sample held 
an extreme view of state responsibility.
Most other research on the welfare state 
attitudes used the ISSP 5-point government 
responsibility items (e.g. to decrease income 
differences, provide jobs, guarantee basic 
income) to examine welfare state attitudes. 
However, since it is not uncommon for 
people to simultaneously accept different 
principles of distributive justice (Deutsch, 
1985; Miller, 1992), and consequently dif-
ferent principles of re-distribution and state 
responsibility, the advantage of the EVS 
item over the ISSP ones is that it forces the 
respondents to choose the principle more 
salient to their viewpoint. The further di-
chotomization of this variable crystallizes 
the respondents with extreme statist per-
spective, which is somewhat incongruent 
with the capitalist market-oriented ideology 
and thus can be interpreted as an undesir-
able answer. Admittedly, this strategy arti-
fi cially removes the variation of the original 
variable, but the distribution of the original 
ordinal variable is already skewed and this 
strategy sharpens the focus on the minority 
whose attitudes on the state responsibility 
challenge the now-dominant liberal ideolo-
gies of the Western world.   
Independent Variables
The main individual-level independent 
variable is Birth Cohort. It consists of three 
15-year cohort categories and the category 
of the oldest respondents: 1) born 1977-91; 
2) born 1962-76; 3) born 1947-61, and 4) 
born 1946 or earlier. Members of the young-
est cohort in the post-communist countries 
are the post-communist generation as they 
were 12 or younger (or not born yet) in 1989, 
which means that they spent their formative 
years in the new capitalist regimes. The 
members of the cohorts 1947-61 and 1962-
76 in the post-communist countries spent 
their whole lives before 1989 in the commu-
nist regimes, so they form the communist 
generations. The fi nal category is a residual 
category of the oldest respondents.5 
The main country-level independent 
variable is Welfare Regime, which serves 
as an indicator of the ideological welfare 
5 The category of the oldest respondents includes people whose formative infl uences cannot be clearly se-
parated, so it is excluded from interpretations of the link between ideological infl uences and cohort differences. 
However, the presence of the oldest respondents may still help in disentangling the cohort and the age effects 
and this is the reason why the oldest respondents were not dropped from the models. The youngest cohort was 
18-32 years old at the time of survey, and the oldest cohort was over 62.Therefore, the bulk of these two co-
horts comprises of two vulnerable populations (the young and the old) usually associated with greater support 
for state (Gelissen, 2000). Hence, if the youngest and the oldest respondents cluster together in greater support 
for state intervention across regimes, this may suggest that the mechanism at work is age effect due to the vul-
nerability of these two groups, rather than the cohort (socialization) effect. However, to anticipate the results, 
the youngest and the oldest respondents have indeed clustered together in their statist expectations, but these 
statist expectations were low, thus suggesting that some other mechanism, rather than the effect of age on sta-
tist values, is at work.
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heritage. The EU member countries and 
Croatia as an acceding member were clas-
sifi ed into fi ve regime types: post-commu-
nist, social democratic, Mediterranean, 
conservative-corporatist and liberal re-
gime (Table 1).
Table 1.






Bulgaria 0.25  0.012 1 357
Croatia 0.24  0.011 1 402
Czech Republic 0.17  0.009 1 666
Estonia 0.20  0.010 1 465
Germany East 0.21  0.013 959
Hungary 0.25  0.011 1 473
Latvia 0.29  0.012 1 400
Lithuania 0.17  0.010 1 324
Poland 0.21  0.011 1 392
Romania 0.17  0.010 1 304
Slovak Republic 0.16  0.010 1 327
Slovenia 0.25  0.012 1 326
Social Democratic Regime
Denmark 0.11  0.008 1 463
Finland 0.14  0.011 1 046
Sweden 0.11  0.010 1 029
Mediterranean Regime
Cyprus 0.20  0.013 910
Greece 0.30  0.012 1 469
Italy 0.28  0.012 1 373
Malta 0.22  0.011 1 399
Portugal 0.11  0.008 1 430
Spain 0.23  0.011 1 371
Conservative-Corporatist 
Regime
Austria 0.12  0.008 1 442
Belgium 0.17  0.010 1 499
France 0.16  0.010 1 479
Germany West 0.08  0.008 1 031
Luxembourg 0.11  0.008 1 478
Netherlands 0.11  0.008 1 517
Liberal Regime
Ireland 0.13  0.012 865
UK (Great Britain & North Ireland) 0.09  0.007 1 823
Total 0.18  0.007 39 019
Source: EVS 2008.
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Controls
I control for self-interest, both at the 
individual and at the country level. At the 
individual level, this includes Gender, Em-
ployment Status (entered as series of dum-
mies) and Education (grand-mean centered). 
Table 2.
Variables Used in Analysis (39019 respondents in 29 countries)
Variable Description and Metric Mean SD
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Extreme Support for State 
Responsibility for Needs
1= Yes, 0=No 0.18 0.39
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Individual-level:  
Birth Cohort Categories:  
          Cohort 1977-1991 1= Yes, 0=No 0.22 0.41
          Cohort 1962-1976 1= Yes, 0=No 0.26 0.44
          Cohort 1947-1961 1= Yes, 0=No 0.26 0.44
          Cohort 1946 and earlier 1= Yes, 0=No 0.26 0.44
Country-level:
Welfare Regimes:
Post-communist 1= Yes, 0=No 0.42 0.49
Social Democratic 1= Yes, 0=No 0.09 0.29
Mediterranean 1= Yes, 0=No 0.20 0.40
Conservative 1= Yes, 0=No 0.22 0.41
Liberal 1= Yes, 0=No 0.07 0.25
CONTROL VARIABLES
Individual-level:
Gender1 1= Male, 2=Female 1.55 0.50
Education1 0 (Pre-primary or None) – 6 (Second Stage of Tertiary Education) 3.02 1.36
Employment Categories:
Full-time (30h/week) 1= Yes, 0=No 0.42 0.49
Part-time (less than 30h/w) 1= Yes, 0=No 0.06 0.23
Self-employed 1= Yes, 0=No 0.05 0.22
Retired 1= Yes, 0=No 0.25 0.44
Housewife 1= Yes, 0=No 0.08 0.27
Student 1= Yes, 0=No 0.06 0.23
Unemployed 1= Yes, 0=No 0.06 0.23
Disabled 1= Yes, 0=No 0.02 0.13
Other 1= Yes, 0=No 0.01 0.09
Satisfaction with Life1 1 (Dissatisfi ed) – 10 (Satisfi ed) 7.19 2.16
View on Country Governance1 1 (Things are going very bad) –10 (Things are going very good) 4.71 2.17
Country-level:
GDP, 20081 
Gross Domestic Product per Capita, Purchasing Power Stan-
dards (EU27=100), Range of data: 10.9 – 69.6
24.60 11.11
GINI Index, 20081




% of total labor force in country, 
Range of data: 2.80 – 11.30
6.28 1.86
Source: EVS 2008, Eurostat 2008, World Bank 2008.
1Variables centered in the analysis (gender on 1.5, the rest at grand mean).
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Following Hox’s recommendation, gender 
(coded 1 for males and 2 for females) is cen-
tered at 1.5 so that the interpretation of the 
intercept refers to average person, disregard-
ing gender (Hox, 2010). The individual-level 
controls also include measures of subjective 
evaluation of one’s own circumstance and 
of the condition in the country: Satisfaction 
with Life and View on System Governing 
the Country (both grand-mean centered). 
The country-level controls of self-interest 
are GDP in 2008 (measured in PPS, grand-
mean centered, Eurostat), GINI Index in 
2008 (grand-mean centered, Eurostat-SILC), 
and Unemployment Rate in 2008 (% of labor 
force, grand-mean centered, World Bank). 
The details on untransformed variables are 
presented in Table 2.
RESULTS
Table 1 summarizes average country 
positions on the extreme support for state 
responsibility. The most statist are the 
post-communist and the Mediterranean 
regimes where over 20% (and sometimes 
close to 30%) respondents in most coun-
tries favored extreme state responsibility. 
Among post-communist countries, Czech 
Republic, Lithuania, Romania and Slovak 
Republic deviate from this pattern. Nev-
ertheless, their levels of extreme statism 
are still higher than in other countries, 
with the exception of France and Belgium 
which stand out among the corporatist, so-
cial-democratic and liberal countries with 
higher statist levels. Among Mediterranean 
regimes, Portugal is the only one with low 
score on extreme statism.
I fi rst estimated the so-called empty 
model with no explanatory variables, which 
provides basic between-country variability 
(Snijders & Bosker, 1999). The intraclass 
correlation coeffi cient (ICC) adapted for 
binary outcomes  as suggested by Snij ders 









) is 0.055, 
which means that about 5% of variance in 
the extreme support for state responsibil-
ity is due to between-country variation. 
Although low, the likelihood ratio test sug-
gests this is signifi cant, as the multilevel 
logit model provides a signifi cantly better 
fi t than one-level logistic regression ( χ 2 (01) 
= 929.02, p<0.05).
Model 1 is a random intercept model 
with only individual-level covariates (Table 
3). After controlling for cohorts and self-
interest, the residual ICC is only slightly 
lower at 0.046. Therefore, in Model 2, 
which contains individual-level covariates 
without non-signifi cant satisfaction of life, 
I added the country-level covariates, which 
decreased the proportion of the unexplained 
country-level variance in the outcome (re-
sidual ICC) to 0.025. However, since the 
effects of GDP, Gini index and the unem-
ployment rate are not signifi cant, I dropped 
them from further analysis. This slightly 
increased the residual ICC to 0.026, but 
Model 3 has better fi t (see AIC statistics 


































explains 8% of variation in the outcome.6 
6 Proportion of explained variance was calculated by the formula provided by Snijders and Boskers for 











σ τ π /
 (1999, pp. 225-226). These authors also warn 
that values of R2
dicho
 are considerably lower than the OLS R2 for continous outcomes.
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Table 3.
Hierarchical General Linear Model of Extreme Support for State Responsibility for Needs in 29 Countries 
(n=39019)
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Cross-level Interactions (Cohort x Regime)




























AIC 35095.47 35092.52 35087.52 35081.95 35077.46
Degrees of Freedom 15 21 18 18 19
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05 (two-tailed for fi xed effects, one-tailed for random effects)
Source: EVS 2008.
Reference Categories: 1Cohort 1977-91; 2Full-Time Employment; 3Post-communist Regime
Table 1. continued
The results from Model 3 suggest that 
for cohorts 1962-77 and 1947-61 the prob-
ability of the extreme support for state is, 
respectively, by 0.13 and by 0.10 higher 
than for the youngest cohort, holding other 
covariates constant (p<0.05).7 Next, the 
post-communist people do not differ from 
the Mediterranean populations in the prob-
ability of extreme statist views. The same is 
true for the social-democratic populations 
(although at 0.10 level the signifi cant dif-
ferences emerge). The contrast, however, is 
clear with the liberal and corporatist popu-
lations who have, respectively, by 0.80 and 
by 0.55 lower probability of extreme statism 
than the post-communist people, holding 
other variables constant (p<0.05).  Further, 
the Wald tests (not shown, p<0.05) suggest 
that the cohorts 1947-61 and 1962-76 do not 
differ mutually. The Mediterranean people 
also do not signifi cantly differ from the so-
cial-democratic populations, although they 
do from the liberal and the corporatist ones. 
Finally, there are no signifi cant differences 
between the liberal, corporatist and social-
democratic regimes. These results indicate 
a clustering of the communist and Mediter-
ranean regimes on the one side with a higher 
7 Interpretation of the coeffi cients in the logit multilevel analysis is similar to the interpretation of the co-
effi cients in the logit regression: the value of the coeffi cient is the predicted probability that the value of the 
outcome variable is 1, when the values of other covariates are identifi ed (Long & Freese, 2006; Rabe-Hesketh 
& Skrondal, 2008).
146
Rev. soc. polit., god. 19, br. 2, str. 131-154, Zagreb 2012. Vučković Juroš T.: Cohort and Welfare Regime Differences...
probability of extreme statist views, and 
a clustering of the corporatist and liberal 
regimes on the other side, with the social-
democratic regime in the middle.
As expected, all the remaining indi-
vidual controls of self-interest have a sig-
nifi cant effect on the probability of extreme 
support for state responsibility. Being fe-
male, as well as working part-time, being 
retired, housewife, unemployed or disabled 
as opposed to working full-time increases 
the probability of extreme expectations of 
state responsibility, whereas higher levels of 
education and a better evaluation of country 
governance decrease this probability. 
The coeffi cients in logit models are not 
interpretable without the identifi cation of 
other covariates, so I calculated probabili-
ties of extreme support for state responsibil-
ity across cohorts and regimes for two types 
of individuals: typical and vulnerable (Table 
4). As expected, the vulnerable individu-
als are more supportive of the state’s role 
across all categories. But, the cohort and 
regime differences are also clear. Both the 
typical and the vulnerable individuals from 
the youngest cohort across all regimes are 
less likely to hold extreme statist views than 
the cohorts 1947-61 and 1962-76. Also, all 
the cohorts from the post-communist and 
Mediterranean regimes have higher prob-
abilities of extreme views on state respon-
sibility than their counterparts from other 
regimes, whose ordering is as expected.
The present study hypothesized that the 
cohort effect would vary across regimes. 
Therefore, I allowed the slopes for cohort 
categories 1947-61 and 1962-76 to vary ran-
domly across countries in Model 4, which 
means that this model assumes that the 
cohort differences function differently for 
each country. This again improved the mod-
el fi t, although it brought down the residual 
ICC to 0.04.The proportion of the explained 
variance remained the same: 8%.  Never-
theless, the likelihood ratio test suggested 
Table 4. 
Predicted Probabilities (from the fi xed part) of Extreme Support for State Responsibility (95% CI)
Cohort 1977-91 Cohort 1962-76 Cohort 1947-61
Typical – Individuals (independently of Gender) with average Education and Full-Time Employment, with 
average score on View on Country Governance:
Post-communist Regime 0.17 (0.15-0.20) 0.19 (0.16-0.22) 0.19 (0.16-0.22)
Social Democratic Regime 0.13 (0.09-0.16) 0.14 (0.10-0.18) 0.14 (0.09-0.18)
Mediterranean Regime 0.17 (0.13-0.21) 0.19 (0.15-0.23) 0.18 (0.15-0.22)
Corporatist Regime 0.11 (0.08-0.13) 0.12 (0.09-0.15) 0.12 (0.09-0.14)
Liberal Regime 0.09 (0.05-0.12) 0.10 (0.06-0.13) 0.09 (0.06-0.13)
Vulnerable – Individuals (independently of Gender) with Primary Education and Unemployed, with average 
score on View on Country Governance:
Post-communist Regime 0.30 (0.26-0.35) 0.33 (0.29-0.38) 0.33 (0.28-0.37)
Social Democratic Regime 0.23 (0.16-0.30) 0.25 (0.18-0.32) 0.25 (0.18-0.32)
Mediterranean Regime 0.30 (0.24-0.35) 0.33 (0.27-0.38) 0.32 (0.26-0.38)
Corporatist Regime 0.20 (0.16-0.25) 0.22 (0.18-0.27) 0.22 (0.17-0.26)
Liberal Regime 0.16 (0.10-0.23) 0.18 (0.12-0.25) 0.18 (0.11-0.24)
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that the Model with the random slopes for 
cohorts 1947-61 and 1962-76 (Model 4) is 
more appropriate than the Model with all 
slopes fi xed (Model 3) (χ2(2)= 9.57, p<0.05). 
This would suggest that, indeed, the co-
hort effect on the extreme support for state 
responsibility does not function equally 
across countries. In Model 5 I attempted 
to account for the part of this variation in 
random slopes for cohorts by cross-level 
interactions of cohorts 1947-61 and 1962-
76 and regimes. Since only one interaction 
(cohort 1962-76—Mediterranean regime) 
was signifi cant and cross-level interactions 
of cohorts and regimes were not jointly 
signifi cant, Model 5 adds only this signifi -
cant interaction to Model 4. The signifi cant 
positive cross-level interaction in Model 5 
suggests that the cohort differences in the 
probability of extreme support for state re-
sponsibility between cohort 1962-76 and 
the youngest cohort are larger in the Medi-
terranean than in the post-communist re-
gimes. Further, the difference between the 
cohort 1962-76 and the youngest cohort in 
the non-Mediterranean regimes (Z=0) is not 
signifi cant.8 The proportion of explained 
variance in Model 5 remained unchanged 
compared to Model 4, but the model fi t 
improved. In addition, controlling for the 
cohort 1962-76—Mediterranean regime 
interaction decreased the residual ICC to 
0.03 and diminished random slopes vari-
ances, which suggests that this cross-level 
interaction accounts for some random vari-
ation in cohort slopes. Therefore, Model 5 
is my fi nal model:
π
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In conclusion, all the cohorts in the post-
communist countries were generally more 
likely to have extreme statist views than 
the individuals in other European welfare 
states, controlling for individual self-inter-
est. The exceptions were the individuals in 
the Mediterranean regimes who clustered 
together with the individuals from the post-
communist regimes in higher probability of 
extreme statist views. Therefore, the fi rst 
hypothesis proposing higher statist expec-
tations in the post-communist regimes is 
confi rmed. However, the fact that the post-
communist individuals were joined by the 
Mediterranean individuals in greater sup-
port for extreme statist views indicates that 
the explanation of this development must be 
more complex than attributing this to “the 
non-communist expectations vs. persistent 
communist expectations” divide. Instead, I 
believe that the clustering of the Mediter-
ranean regimes with the post-communist 
ones could be explained by a small adapta-
tion of the welfare expectations argument. 
This requires defi ning the dominant welfare 
practices as determinants of the welfare ex-
pectations, rather than the dominant welfare 
ideologies. 
In most cases, these two are integrat-
ed (e.g. liberal regimes implement liberal 
8 In models with cross-level interactions, the effects of the interaction and the effects of the explanatory 
variables involved in an interaction should be considered together. The cross-level interaction between the indi-
vidual-level variable x and the country-level variable Z is interpreted as the main effect of the individual-level 
variable x on the outcome variable conditioned on the particular value of the country-level variable Z. The 
direct effect of the individual-level variable x involved in an interaction should be interpreted as the effect of 
x on the outcome when the value of country-level variable Z is 0 (Snijders & Bosker, 1999; Hox, 2010).
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welfare practices), but in the case of the 
Mediterranean regimes they were not. The 
Mediterranean regimes are characterized 
by welfare practices based on ineffective 
state institutions, corruption and political 
clientelism. Such practices teach people 
they can have their needs satisfi ed by the 
state, provided they follow the informal 
rules. As a result, the state responsibility for 
needs becomes the informally established 
expectation, independent of the formal 
ruling ideology. Similar discrepancy be-
tween the ideology of universal and gener-
ous social rights and the bureaucratization 
and hidden privileges was characteristic of 
communism as well, and likely cemented 
the emphasis on state as provider of needs 
(whether legally or by following the infor-
mal rules). Therefore, the legacy of domi-
nant state-oriented welfare practices might 
explain the distinctiveness of the post-com-
munist and the Mediterranean regimes in 
higher probabilities of extreme views on 
state responsibility.
In other regimes, the welfare practices 
and the welfare regime ideologies were in-
tegrated.  For this reason, the results from 
other regimes are consistent with the ideol-
ogy argument expectations, as can be seen 
from the regime rankings in Table 4 that are 
mostly consistent with the ranking of wel-
fare ideology expectations. Specifi cally, the 
individuals in the liberal regimes have the 
lowest scores on the extreme statist views, 
and they are followed by the individuals 
from the corporatist regime, and then by 
the individuals from the social democratic 
regimes. Therefore, the regime differences 
do matter.
The second hypothesis of the present 
study proposed a cultural lag of the co-
horts 1947-61 and 1962-76 compared to the 
youngest cohort, as these two older cohorts 
were predominantly socialized in the ideo-
logical environment which gave the state a 
greater role in taking care of people’s needs 
in all Western regimes. I further expected 
that this cultural lag would be more pro-
nounced among the cohorts 1947-61 and 
1962-76 in the former communist countries 
since the “welfare-friendly” period in which 
they were socialized was further com-
pounded by the specifi c communist welfare 
arrangements of the countries in which they 
lived.  Under the life-course assumption 
about stability of attitudes formed during 
the formative years, I proposed that these 
“communist generations” remained con-
stant in their “communist” value systems. 
The youngest (post-communist) generation, 
on the other hand, was possibly more af-
fected by the radical post-communist trans-
formations. It would follow that the differ-
ences in extreme statist views between the 
youngest and the older generations should 
be more pronounced in the post-communist 
regimes than in other European welfare 
states where no comparable radical social 
transformation that would separate these 
generations so sharply occurred. However, 
the results of the present study have not con-
fi rmed this hypothesis. The youngest cohort 
was indeed more likely to have lower scores 
on the probability of extreme statist views 
than the cohort 1947-61 in all regimes, but 
this cohort gap was generally not wider in 
the post-communist regimes than in the 
non-communist regimes. Therefore, the di-
vide separating the cohort 1947-61, social-
ized in the “golden period” of the welfare 
state across all regimes, from the youngest 
cohort 1977-91, socialized in the period of 
weakening of that welfare state across all 
regimes (Nullmeier & Kaufmann, 2010), 
suggests that this cohort gap is more likely 
the outcome of the global welfare trends 
rather than the trends specifi c to the post-
communist (or Mediterranean) states. Nev-
ertheless, the specifi c welfare practices of 
particular regimes do matter, as seen from 
the regime differences in the scores on ex-
treme statism that are consistent across all 
cohorts. 
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However, whereas the cohort gap in the 
probability of extreme statist expectations 
between the cohort 1947-61 and the young-
est cohort is quite clear, the relationship be-
tween the cohort 1962-76 and the youngest 
cohort is more complex. On the one hand, 
the results suggest the youngest cohort is 
also less statist than the cohort 1962-76. 
On the other hand, the model controlling 
for the cohort-regime interactions suggests 
that in the non-Mediterranean regimes the 
signifi cance of this cohort gaps disappears, 
while in the Mediterranean regimes this 
cohort gap in extreme statist views is sig-
nifi cant and larger than in the post-commu-
nist regimes. What are the implications of 
such fi ndings? First, this seems to suggest 
a similarity between the cohorts 1962-76 
(coming to age in times when the upcoming 
welfare state crisis was becoming more ap-
parent) and the youngest cohort 1977-91 in 
the non-Mediterranean regimes. Hence, it 
seems that the values divide between these 
two consecutive cohorts is not as sharp as 
between the youngest cohort and the cohort 
1947-61. This, in turn, suggests a gradual 
generational shift in the welfare state at-
titudes in the non-Mediterranean regimes, 
most likely due to the infl uences of the glo-
bal welfare trends that affected the cohorts 
of the former communist and the cohorts of 
other non-communist countries similarly. 
This shift in values, however, continued 
to follow the particular regime trajecto-
ries, as evidenced by the persistent regime 
differences in the extreme statist views of 
these two cohorts across post-communist, 
social democratic, corporatist and liberal 
countries.  But, why does this not hold for 
the Mediterranean regimes as well? Why 
the divide in the extreme statist views be-
tween the youngest cohort and the cohort 
1962-76 remains sharper in the Mediter-
ranean than in other countries? Explaining 
this is likely beyond the scope of this paper, 
but I would suggest the following specula-
tion. It is possible that because the Medi-
terranean populations did not experience 
such a radical institutional transformation 
like the post-communist populations did, 
the cohort 1962-76 in the Mediterranean 
countries remained more entrenched in the 
habits of their dominant state-oriented wel-
fare practices and consequent high statist 
expectations. The communist cohort 1962-
76, on the other hand, had their expecta-
tions more shaken up by the very obvious 
different institutional confi gurations of the 
new post-communist welfare states and thus 
they clustered closer to the post-communist 
generations for which such greater insecuri-
ties about the role of the state were part of 
their coming of age.
In conclusion, the present study suggests 
that the welfare state expectations are af-
fected by the individuals’ welfare environ-
ments, where welfare environments are 
defi ned both at the global and at regime 
level. First, the global welfare state trends 
determine welfare environments by affect-
ing countries’ welfare policies. Thus, the 
generations coming of age in golden times 
of welfare state and generous welfare prac-
tices were more likely to favor state respon-
sibility for needs than the new generations 
growing up in the world of globalizing and 
liberalizing pressures on the welfare state 
The welfare regimes determine welfare 
environments as well, by mediating global 
welfare trends via its ideologies and prac-
tices. The welfare ideologies and practices 
are in most cases integrated, thus leading to 
the ranking of the statist expectations con-
gruent with the regime ideologies. However, 
when they are not, as in the Mediterranean 
regimes, the welfare practices, which form 
the reality of people’s everyday lives, seem 
to take precedence over the dominant re-
gime ideology. Finally, the welfare state 
expectations show endurance in face of 
change. Thus, the post-communist and the 
Mediterranean regimes, both characterized 
by the legacy of the statist practices, also 
stand out with the higher probability of 
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extreme statist attitudes among all cohorts 
which persist despite the global and particu-
lar (post-communist) institutional changes. 
Therefore, once formed, the welfare public 
preferences matter and should prove a rel-
evant factor in evaluating the legitimacy of 
welfare states. 
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Sažetak
RAZLIKE MEĐU KOHORTAMA I REŽIMIMA SOCIJALNE DRŽAVE U 
STAVOVIMA PREMA DRŽAVI: VIŠERAZINSKA ANALIZA 29 ZEMALJA
Tanja Vučković Juroš
Studijski centar socijalnog rada, Pravni fakultet Sveučilišta u Zagrebu
Zagreb, Hrvatska
Mnoga su istraživanja proučavala odnos režima socijalne države i stavova o državi, 
no njihovi su rezultati raznoliki. Ovaj rad pristupa tom problemu fokusiravši se na 
postkomunističke režime koje obilježava nasljeđe snažnog etatizma i raznovrsnih putanja 
razvoja socijalne države nakon 1989./1991. Na temelju podataka iz EVS 2008 autorica 
uspoređuje stavove o odgovornosti države u postkomunističkim režimima naspram ostalih 
režima, pri čemu se posebice bavi kohortnim razlikama. Rezultati ukazuju na veću vjero-
jatnost ekstremnih etatističkih stavova među generacijama socijaliziranim u razdoblju 
velikodušnih socijalnih praksi. Razlike među režimima su također bitne te govore u prilog 
važnosti praksi režima socijalnih država za stavove o državi. Na to, u konačnici, ukazuju 
i sličnosti između postkomunističkih i mediteranskih režima koji se ističu i nasljeđem 
etatističkih praksi i većom vjerojatnošću ekstremnih etatističkih stavova među sve četiri 
kohorte.
Ključne riječi: stavovi o državi, režimi socijalne države, postkomunizam, kohortne 
razlike, višerazinska logit analiza.

